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Investigations into the neurobiology of moral cognition are often done by examining
clinical populations characterized by diminished moral emotions and a proclivity toward
immoral behavior. Psychopathy is the most common disorder studied for this purpose.
Although cocaine abuse is highly co-morbid with psychopathy and cocaine-dependent
individuals exhibit many of the same abnormalities in socio-affective processing as
psychopaths, this population has received relatively little attention in moral psychology.
To address this issue, the authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to record hemodynamic activity in 306 incarcerated male adults, stratified into regular
cocaine users (n = 87) and a matched sample of non-cocaine users (n = 87), while
viewing pictures that did or did not depict immoral actions and determining whether each
depicted scenario occurred indoors or outdoors. Consistent with expectations, cocaine
users showed abnormal neural activity in several frontostriatial regions during implicit
moral picture processing compared to their non-cocaine using peers. This included
reduced moral/non-moral picture discrimination in the vACC, vmPFC, lOFC, and left
vSTR. Additionally, psychopathy was negatively correlated with activity in an overlapping
region of the ACC and right lateralized vSTR. These results suggest that regular cocaine
abuse may be associated with affective deficits which can impact relatively high-level
processes like moral cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
“Moral cognition” refers to a set of complex processes giving rise to, and including, an individuals’
judgments about the moral status of a person or action in a particular scenario. Academic
interest in this aspect of our social world has been longstanding, but recent decades have seen a
rapid expansion of moral psychological research into a myriad of scientific disciplines. Cognitive
neuroscience is one of the more recent members— employing newly emerging neuroimaging
techniques to provide novel insights into the neural circuitry engaged by moral cognition.
Many differing theoretical perspectives on moral cognition have followed, but one aspect which
is widely shared amongst them is the bifurcation of moral decision-making into two relatively
distinct, though highly interdependent, processes. The first, which we will refer to as “moral
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intuition,” consists of relatively automatic and reflexive
operations through which an individual attends and responds
to the morally-salient aspects of a given stimulus. “Moral
deliberation,” by contrast, denotes more deliberative and
cognitively taxing processes (e.g., evaluating the moral
appropriateness of stimuli and identifying morally appropriate
actions; Harenski et al., 2010a). The precise nature and role of
these two processes is controversial (Haidt, 2001; Pizarro and
Bloom, 2003; Greene et al., 2004; Hauser, 2006), but it is widely
assumed that both play a significant role in moral cognition.
Studying these two processes in isolation has subsequently
become a major focus in moral cognition research (for review
see Hauser, 2006).
The primary way neuroimaging studies have begun to tease
apart these processes is by subtle task manipulations. To date,
the majority of neuroimaging studies have employed “explicit”
moral judgment tasks, in which participants are shown morally-
salient stimuli and asked to rate their moral appropriateness.
Because performance of these tasks requires both attendance
to and reflective consideration of the moral information
presented, the resultant neural activity likely represents both
moral intuition and deliberation. The brain regions most
consistently activated during explicit moral judgment tasks
include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ),
cingulate cortices (ACC and PCC), and amygdala (Amyg; for
review see Fumagalli and Priori, 2012).
In contrast, a minority of neuroimaging studies have utilized
‘implicit’ moral tasks, in which morally-salient stimuli are
presented but explicit moral judgments are not required. Tasks
of this sort are thought to maintain the reflexive, perceptual
aspects of moral cognition while minimizing its deliberative
components. These studies have generally identified the TPJ and
PCC as being central to the earliest stages of moral cognition
(Harenski and Hamann, 2006; Moll et al., 2007; Schiach-Borg
et al., 2008; Harenski et al., 2010a; Decety and Cacioppo,
2012).
Over the past decade, researchers have begun examining
the neurobiology of moral cognition in clinical populations
characterized by diminished moral emotions (e.g., guilt,
empathy) and a proclivity toward immoral behavior.
Psychopathy is the most common disorder studied for
this purpose—a personality disorder typified by a suite of
interpersonal, affective, and behavioral characteristics including
grandiosity, callousness, and lack of empathy (Cleckley, 1976;
Hare, 2003; Hare and Neumann, 2008). Individuals at the high
end of this spectrum are targeted because they demonstrate
a marked moral insensitivity and are disproportionately
responsible for repetitive crime and violence in society (Hart and
Hare, 1989; Harris et al., 1991; Hemphill et al., 1998).
Substance abuse is, in many ways, comparable to psychopathy,
but has received much less attention in moral psychology.
Substance abuse and psychopathy are highly co-morbid (Smith
and Newman, 1990; Walsh et al., 2007) and substance abusers
have consistently shown social and affective deficits compared to
healthy controls (Aguilar de Arcos et al., 2005; Verdejo-García
et al., 2007; Fernández-Serrano et al., 2010; Volkow et al., 2011).
After cannabis, cocaine is the secondmost widely abused illicit
drug in the United States, with an estimated 4.4 million users in
the United States as of 2013 (NSDUH). Moreover, both current
and former cocaine-dependent individuals exhibit many of the
same abnormalities in socio-affective processing as psychopaths.
Psychopaths exhibit significant deficits in affective empathy and
facial affect recognition (for review see Brook et al., 2013).
Cocaine abusers, both active and abstinent, show similar deficits
in emotion recognition, with fear being the most consistently
misidentified emotional expression (Foisy et al., 2005; Fox et al.,
2007, 2011; Kemmis et al., 2007; Verdejo-García et al., 2007;
Fernández-Serrano et al., 2010; Morgan and Marshall, 2013).
Deficits in social cognition have been observed as well, with
cocaine abusers exhibiting impaired empathy (Ferrari et al., 2014;
Hulka et al., 2014; Preller et al., 2014).
Social, affective, and moral cognition are thought to be highly
interrelated at the neural level (Young and Dungan, 2012). As
such, the similarities in social and affective abnormalities between
psychopaths and cocaine abusers may very well extend into the
moral domain. Although researchers have only recently begun to
examine moral cognition amongst current and former substance
abusers, early results have supported this conclusion. Similar
to psychopaths, polysubstance dependent individuals have been
found to make more “utilitarian” moral judgments than healthy
controls (Carmona-Perera et al., 2012; Kornreich et al., 2013).
The only neuroimaging study comparing moral cognition in
cocaine-dependent and non-dependent individuals found that
cocaine-dependent individuals did show reduced activity in
paralimbic structures such as the dorsal ACC, PAG, and anterior
insula while making moral judgments (Verdejo-García et al.,
2012).
The somatic marker theory of addiction (Verdejo-García and
Bechara, 2009) is a promising framework for conceptualizing
the relationship between substance abuse and social cognition.
This model theorizes two distinct, though highly interdependent,
neural systems which play a role in any sort of decision-making.
The core structure of the “impulsive neural system” is the
amygdala, which couples stimuli with their associated somatic
state. That somatic state is generated by effector structures such as
the hypothalamus, autonomic brainstem nuclei, ventral striatum,
and periaqueductal gray. The core structure of the “reflective
neural system” is the vmPFC, which integrates emotional
information—generated by the insula and PCC—and cognitive
information—generated by the dlPFC and hippocampus. Drug
addiction is thought to be the result of a hyperactive impulsive
system, which weakens the regulatory power of the reflective
system.
Etiologically, this is likely the result of the abused drug
“hijacking” the normal reward circuitry, leading to an over-
valuation of the drug at a neurological level. Current and
abstinent stimulant addicts have demonstrated exaggerated
autonomic responses to cues related to the substances they
abuse(d) and a muted response to all non-drug affective stimuli
(e.g., cues related to food, sex, etc. . . ; Aguilar de Arcos et al., 2005;
Asensio et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011b). Blunted positive responses
to pro-social interactions and blunted negative responses to
socially aversive experiences could account for the deficits in
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social cognition and deleterious social behavior of stimulant-
dependent individuals (Volkow et al., 2011). Indeed, a few studies
have found that the emotional and decision-making deficits seen
in cocaine-dependent individuals are linked to the real-world
social dysfunction of addicts (Cunha et al., 2011; Preller et al.,
2014).
The extant neuroimaging studies on social and moral
cognition in cocaine abusers have two notable limitations.
First, none of these studies have examined moral intuition
amongst cocaine abusers. Many real-world moral evaluations
occur spontaneously upon the presentation of a morally
salient social situation. An examination of moral intuition
specifically may therefore provide us with a more ecologically
rounded assessment of moral cognition. Secondly, none of
these substance abuse studies examined the potential impact
of comorbid psychopathy. The overlapping prevalence and
associated neuropsychological deficits exhibited by these two
disorders suggests that they may confound one another.
Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to evaluate brain activity during the performance of a moral
intuitive processing task by individuals with varying levels of
psychopathy and (past) cocaine use. Using the Mind Research
Network’s mobile MRI system, incarcerated participants were
scanned while viewing pictures that did or did not contain moral
violations (e.g., a hand breaking into a house vs. a mutilated
hand), as well as affectively neutral pictures (e.g., a hand being
fingerprinted), and judging whether each picture depicted a
scene occurring indoors or outdoors. Participants were therefore
exposed to morally salient stimuli, but were not made aware of
the moral/non-moral picture distinction (Harenski et al., 2010a).
Integrating the findings of prior studies, we predicted that
former cocaine users would exhibit reduced hemodynamic
activity compared to non-cocaine users during the implicit
processing of moral stimuli. Given the theorized etiology for
such an effect, we predicted that abnormalities amongst cocaine
users would be located in brain regions along the dopaminergic
pathway normally used for reward processing—including the
striatum, ACC and mPFC. Additionally, we hypothesized that
cocaine users high in psychopathic traits would exhibit greater
abnormalities in these areas compared to cocaine users lower in
psychopathic traits.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
This study included 316 incarcerated male volunteers recruited
from correctional facilities in New Mexico and Wisconsin.
Inclusion criteria were: age between 18 and 50, reading level
above 4th grade, IQ above 75, no history of seizures, no current
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th
Edn.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) Axis I diagnosis
(excluding substance abuse), and no lifetime history of a
psychotic disorder in self or first-degree relative. Incarcerated
participants were in a controlled environment with restricted
access to illicit drugs, and all reported to be abstinent from
substance use for at least 1 month prior to testing. Ten
incarcerated participants were excluded from analysis due to
excessive motion during scanning. The final sample included
311 incarcerated participants. Incarcerated participants were
included in the “Cocaine User” (CU) group if they had regularly
used cocaine (three or more times per week) for any duration
of time (n = 87). The remaining incarcerated participants
were assigned to the Non-Cocaine Using (NCU) group (n =
219). Additionally, a subset of the NCU group was matched
with the CU group on age, IQ, psychopathy and severity of use
for substances other than cocaine. This subset will be referred
to as the Matched Non-Cocaine Users (mNCU). Demographic
information on each group is provided in Table 1. Group
comparisons on demographic variables between these three
subsamples are provided in Table 2.
In order to generate task-specific ROIs, fMRI data was
analyzed from a separate sample of 36 non-incarcerated male
volunteers. Non-incarcerated participants were held to the same
inclusion criteria, with the additional requirement that non-
incarcerated participants be excluded if they had any history of
an alcohol or drug use disorder.
Assessments
Psychopathy was assessed in all incarcerated participants
using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare,
2003), which is a reliable and valid instrument for assessing
psychopathy in incarcerated populations (Hare, 1980, 1996;
Hart and Hare, 1989; Fulero, 1996). Trained researchers
conducted semi-structured interviews covering topics such as
school, employment, relationships, family, and criminal activity.
Interview information was also corroborated by a review of
the participant’s institutional records. The PCL-R contains 20
items designed to measure the personality and behavioral
characteristics of psychopathy. Each of these items is scored
on a 3-point scale and total scores range from 0 to 40. Factor
analyses of the PCL-R have suggested that its items load onto
two correlated factors. Factor 1 contains items having to do
with the affective/interpersonal features of psychopathy, while
Factor 2 consists of those features of psychopathy associated
with an impulsive, antisocial, and unstable lifestyle (Hare,
2003).
All participants completed the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV Disorders (SCID; First et al., 2002) with a trained
research assistant, to assess past and present Axis I and
II disorders. This included the drug use disorder screening
questionnaire and module, which were used to evaluate alcohol
and drug disorder histories for exclusion purposes (non-
incarcerated participants) and identify prior substance use
disorders for data analysis (incarcerated participants). Over 80%
of incarcerated participants met criteria for a past substance use
disorder, accounting for the majority of past Axis I disorders in
the sample (see Table S1 for a breakdown of SCID diagnoses).
Drug use history was collected using a modified version of
the Addiction Severity Index (ASI; Mclellan et al., 1992). This
assessment asked participants about their past use of alcohol,
heroin, other opiates, cocaine, cannabis, methamphetamine,
other amphetamines, and nicotine. For each of these substances,
participants were asked if they ever used that substance three or
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TABLE 1 | Demographic information of incarcerated cocaine users and non-cocaine users.
Variable NCU (n = 219) CU(n = 87) mNCU (n = 87)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 32.15 8.07 34.9 8.08 33.59 8.90
IQ 98.66 13.66 100.62 13.09 99.34 13.27
PSYCHOPATHY
PCLR Total 22.265 7.4594 24.34 6.11 23.31 7.82
PCLR Factor 1 8.037 3.7866 8.05 3.73 8.05 3.99
PCLR Factor 2 12.186 4.2716 13.86 3.13 13.04 4.29
SUBSTANCE USE HISTORY
Alcohol 0.105 0.148 0.205 0.195 0.17 0.18
Cannabis 0.199 0.198 0.351 0.208 0.31 0.21
Heroin 0.061 0.054 0.122 0.105 0.02 0.09
Other Opiates 0.018 0.067 0.056 0.101 0.03 0.09
Cocaine 0.000 0.000 0.136 0.141 0.00 0.00
Methamphetamine 0.007 0.043 0.051 0.128 0.01 0.07
Other Amphetamines 0.007 0.034 0.026 0.095 0.01 0.05
Nicotine 0.248 0.223 0.408 0.194 0.36 0.23
N % N % N %
RACE
American Indian/Alaskan Native 12 5.5 0 0 7 8
Asian 1 0.5 0 0 1 1.1
Black 73 33.3 13 14.9 27 31
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 3 1.4 0 0 0 0
White 111 50.7 59 67.8 44 50.6
Other/Decline 19 8.7 15 17.2 8 9.2
ETHNICITY
Not Hispanic 193 88.1 64 73.6 77 88.5
Hispanic 26 11.9 23 26.4 10 11.5
HANDEDNESS
Right 184 84 78 89.7 73 83.9
Left 26 11.9 7 8 11 12.6
Ambidextrous 9 41 2 2.3 3 3.4
For each substance, substance use history is represented by the proportion of an individual’s lifetime the substance was being used regularly (e.g., Alcohol Use = 0.1044 means the
participant used alcohol regularly for 10.44% of his life).
more times per week and for how long they used the substance at
least that often. To compensate for age as a confounding variable,
severity of use for each substance was calculated by dividing the
number of months of regular use by the age of the participant at
the time of the interview. Abstinence information was collected
in two different ways (see SupplementaryMaterials for additional
information). Seventy-seven of the 306 incarcerated participants
were simply asked how much of the substance in question they
had used within the past 30 days. Those who reported no use
were coded as “abstinent” for that substance. The remaining 229
incarcerated participants were asked to give an approximate date
for the last time they had used the substance in question. For this
sample, duration of abstinence was set by calculating the number
of months between their last reported use and the date at which
the assessment was administered (see Table S2 for additional
substance use information).
The Balanced Inventory of Desired Responding (BIDR) was
administered in order to gauge the accuracy of other self-report
measures. The BIDR (Paulhus, 1984) is a 40 item inventory
using a 7-point Likert scale consisting of two subscales: Self-
Deception and Impression Management. The Self Deception
scale is designed to assess defensiveness toward personal threats
and positively biased responding that the respondent believes
to be true (e.g., “I am a completely rational person”). The
ImpressionManagement scale is designed tomeasure responding
that is guided by a desire to create a favorable impression on
others (e.g., “I never take things that don’t belong to me”).
IQ was estimated using the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning
subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS;
Wechsler, 1997; Ryan et al., 1999). Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants, after a complete description of the
study procedures. The study was reviewed and approved by the
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TABLE 2 | Group comparisons of demographic information for incarcerated cocaine users and non-cocaine users.
Variable CU vs. NCU CU vs. mNCU
t df p t df p
Age 2.69 304 0.008 1.02 172 0.312
IQ 1.15 304 0.252 0.64 172 0.523
PSYCHOPATHY
PCLR Total 2.51 191.4 0.013 0.97 163 0.336
PCLR Factor 1 0.02 304 0.984 0.00 172 1.000
PCLR Factor 2 3.74 217.33 0.000 1.42 152 0.158
SUBSTANCE USE HISTORY
Alcohol 4.34 127.44 0.000 1.16 172 0.246
Cannabis 5.98 304 0.000 1.60 172 0.112
Heroin 3.02 107.90 0.003 1.45 169 0.150
Other Opiates 3.24 116.88 0.002 1.43 172 0.155
Cocaine 9.00 86 0.000 9.12 172 0.000
Methamphetamine 3.14 93.791 0.002 2.37 172 0.019
Other Amphetamines 1.82 94.704 0.073 1.08 172 0.283
Nicotine 6.22 180.47 0.000 1.62 172 0.107
χ
2 df p χ2 df p
Race 21.25001 5 0.001 17.2149 4 0.002
Ethnicity 9.82098 1 0.002 6.319794 1 0.012
Handedness 1.644219 2 0.440 1.25 2 0.534
For each substance, substance use history is represented by the proportion of an individual’s lifetime the substance was being used regularly.
University of New Mexico Human Research Review Committee.
Participants received monetary compensation for participation.
Incarcerated participants were paid at a rate commensurate to
work assignments at their facility.
Stimuli and Task
Three sets of pictures (25 moral, 25 non-moral, 25 neutral)
were selected, largely from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS; Lang et al., 1995), and supplemented with pictures
from media sources. Each moral picture depicted an unpleasant
social scene which included a moral violation (e.g., one person
attacking another). Non-moral pictures also showed unpleasant
social scenes, but they did not contain moral content (e.g.,
two individuals arguing). Neutral pictures depicted social scenes
which were both affectively neutral and devoid of moral content
(e.g., two individuals having a conversation). Moral and non-
moral pictures were selected based on ratings from a pilot study
in which participants rated 100 unpleasant pictures on the moral
status of the action depicted. Pictures which were rated highest
and lowest on moral violation severity were assigned to the
moral and non-moral conditions, respectively. Moral and non-
moral pictures were alsomatched on emotional arousal and social
complexity, and neutral pictures werematched tomoral and non-
moral pictures for social complexity. Within studies in which
moral violation severity ratings were collected, the pictures in the
moral subset have consistently been rated significantly higher on
moral violation severity than non-moral pictures (Harenski and
Hamann, 2006; Harenski et al., 2010b).
Participants were told that they would see a series of pictures
depicting various people and events. For each picture, they were
instructed to determine whether the social scene shown was
taking place indoors or outdoors. Participants were not informed
of the moral/non-moral distinction across pictures. After being
given these instructions, participants completed at least five
practice trials in the scanner to ensure that they understood how
to perform the task. For each trial, a picture from one of the
three sets was displayed on screen for 6 s. Then, participants were
presented with a screen reading “Indoor/Outdoor?” and given
4 s to indicate their answer. They were instructed to press one
button with their index finger if the picture occurred indoors, and
a different button with their middle finger if the picture occurred
outdoors. Each of the three picture conditions contained the
same proportion of indoor and outdoor pictures (44/56%).
Moral, non-moral, and neutral picture trials were presented
in a random order and interspersed with 25 null trials in
which a fixation cross was presented for the entire trial. The
100 total trials were presented across two separate runs of the
task. Images were rear-projected into the scanner using an LCD
projector, controlled by a PC computer. Tasks were designed
and presented and responses were recorded using Presentation
software (Version 10.78, http://www.neurobs.com/).
MRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
MR images were collected using a mobile Siemens 1.5T Avanto
with advanced SQ gradients (max slew rate 200 T/m/s, 346 T/m/s
vector summation, rise time 200µs) equipped with a 12-element
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head coil. The EPI gradient-echo pulse sequence (TR/TE
2000/39ms, flip angle 90◦, FOV 24 × 24 cm, 64 × 64 matrix,
3.4× 3.4mm in-plane resolution, 5mm slice thickness, 30 slices)
effectively covered the entire brain (150mm) in 2.0 s. Head
motion was minimized using padding and restraint.
To correct residual head motion, “bad” images (confounded
by motion or radio-frequency spikes) were estimated and
removed using ART-Repair (Mazaika et al., 2009). These images
were determined by calculating the mean intensity for a given
time series and identifying individual images whose intensity
was greater than four standard deviations from the mean. The
offending image(s) were replaced in the time series by a rolling
mean image, and regressed in the statistical model. The mean
number of images removed across participants was 1.98 (of 356).
Imaging data were analyzed using SPM5
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5). Functional images
were spatially normalized to the MNI template and smoothed
(8mm FWHM). Picture presentations (moral, non-moral,
neutral) and the rating period for all pictures were modeled as
four separate events. Each event was modeled with a six (picture)
or four (indoor/outdoor judgment) second hemodynamic
response function. Functional images were computed for each
participant that represented brain activation associated with
viewing moral, non-moral, or neutral pictures. The moral >
non-moral picture comparison evaluated brain activation to
morally-salient pictures while controlling for general emotional
and social content.
The relationship between substance use and neural activity
can be characterized by both the general effect of substance
use, and by correlations between the severity of substance
use and neural activity. Moreover, substance use disorders are
generally conceptualized as taxa (DSM-5; ICD-10), although
dimensional models have been proposed more recently (e.g.,
Muthén, 2006; Eaton et al., 2015; for review see Haslam et al.,
2012). Consequently, the relationship between hemodynamic
responses during the moral > non-moral condition and cocaine
use was analyzed in two stages. First, a two-sample t-test
compared the CU group to the mNCU group. This comparison
group was matched on age, IQ, psychopathy and severity of
use and duration of abstinence for the following substances:
alcohol, cannabis, heroin, other opiates, other amphetamines
and nicotine. Second, severity of cocaine use was entered into a
regression with individual moral > non-moral contrast images
only for CUs. Age, IQ, psychopathy and severity of use for
alcohol, cannabis, heroin, other opiates, other amphetamines,
and nicotine were also entered in as covariates into this
regression. Only CUs were included in this regression analysis
because severity of cocaine use was positively skewed within the
full incarcerated sample (skewness= 1.946, kurtosis= 2.898). To
correct for skew within the CU sample, severity of cocaine use
was calculated by taking the square root of the duration of regular
use divided by the participant’s age (Ermer et al., 2012).
Additionally, duration of abstinence from regular cocaine
use was entered into a regression with individual moral >
non-moral contrast images only for CUs who had abstinence
information available (n = 61). Age, IQ, psychopathy, severity
of use for cocaine, alcohol, cannabis, heroin, other opiates, other
amphetamines and nicotine, and duration of abstinence for
alcohol, cannabis, heroin, other opiates, other amphetamines and
nicotine were also entered in as covariates into this regression
(see Supplementary Materials for additional information). There
were no significant group differences between CUs, mNCUs, or
NCUs in the number of abstinent participants or the duration of
abstinence for any substances (see Tables S2A–C).
Age and IQ scores were not significantly correlated with PCL-
R or Factor scores. Consistent with the extant literature, CUs
were significantly higher on Factor 2 scores, but not on Factor
1, compared to the NCU sample (see Table 2). IQ was not
significantly correlated with any cocaine use measures.
Analyses were performed on a voxel-by-voxel basis over the
entire brain using the general linear model in SPM. Hypotheses
were tested in regions of interest (PCC, vmPFC, ACC, vSTR,
dlPFC). Peak coordinates for these regions were drawn from
the moral > non-moral functional maps of a separate sample of
36 non-incarcerated participants (see Table 3 for results). In all
a priori regions of interest, family-wise error extent thresholds
were small-volume corrected using 10mm spheres surrounding
the peak coordinate.
Whole-brain analyses were thresholded at p < 0.001, and
FWE corrected using cluster-extent based thresholding with
primary threshold of p < 0.05. Cluster thresholds for whole-
brain family-wise error multiple comparison correction were
derived from Monte Carlo simulations (3dClustSim, AFNI,
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov). For the group comparison of CUs
and mNCUs, the cluster threshold was set at ≥ 1026mm3
(38 contiguous voxels). For the regression analysis within the
entire incarcerated sample, the cluster threshold was set more
stringently at ≥ 1134mm3 (42 contiguous voxels).
Imaging Results
We first examined the main effects of viewing moral >
non-moral pictures across all non-incarcerated participants
(Figure 1). Consistent with a previous study employing this task
in a non-clinical population, the main effect of moral vs. non-
moral pictures in the non-incarcerated sample revealed increased
hemodynamic response in regions previously implicated in
moral intuition (Harenski et al., 2010a)— including the bilateral
temporo-parietal junction and posterior cingulate cortex. The
main effect of moral vs. non-moral pictures in the non-
incarcerated sample showed a similar pattern of results (see
Table 3 for main effects).
Relative to matched non-cocaine users, cocaine users showed
significantly reduced hemodynamic activity in the moral >
non-moral contrast in several cortical and subcortical regions.
Whole-brain analysis revealed reduced activity in both the left
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) and right superior
frontal gyrus (SFG). Small-volume correction revealed additional
areas of hypoactivation. In the left hemisphere, these included
the ventral and dorsal striatum (vSTR and dSTR), ventral
anterior cingulate cortex (vACC), ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), and middle temporal gyrus (MTG). On the
right, hypoactivity was observed in the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (dmPFC) extending into the rostral anterior cingulate
cortex (rACC), and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC)
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TABLE 3 | Imaging results for healthy controls and full incarcerated sample.
Region BA x y z t k p x y Z t k p
L. TPJ 39 −48 −60 30 5.05 594 0.000 −51 −60 27 13.53 7810 0.000
R. TPJ 39 54 −48 24 4.55 213 0.004 54 −54 24 10.14
L. Fusiform 19/37 −21 −45 −9 3.65 29 0.95 −24 −42 −12 13.19
L. MTG 21 −48 −18 −18 3.49 16 0.998 −57 −21 −12 8.09
L. MTG 21 −51 −33 −3 3.1 6 1 −60 −36 −6 7.02
B. PCC 23/31 6 −60 30 4.8 236 0.002 0 −18 39 3.32 4 0.979
L. dmPFC 9 −9 60 33 4.13 118 0.076 −3 48 36 9.39 3063 0.000
L. rostral ACC 32 15 39 15 3.22 2 1 −6 51 15 8.84
L. dlPFC 8 −42 15 54 3.91 24 0.981 −48 15 45 8.4
R. dlPFC 8 24 27 54 3.35 12 1 45 15 45 5.5 149 0.001
L. vmPFC 47 −33 21 −21 3.79 22 0.988 −30 21 −15 4.95
L. vmPFC 10 −21 60 21 2.8 1 1 −24 57 27 5.08
R. vmPFC 10 3 57 −9 2.77 1 1 −3 57 −9 6.42
L. vlPFC 45/44 −54 21 18 3.62 12 1 −57 21 15 5.91
R. vlPFC 47 42 30 −12 3.72 9 0.879
L. ventral ACC 32 −12 45 0 3.39 8 1 −30 60 12 3.36 5 0.965
L. Putamen 49 −21 9 9 3.3 17 0.998 −12 3 9 3.28 2 0.995
L. Temporal Pole 38 −51 6 −33 2.98 2 1 −39 18 −33 3.19 1 0.998
R. Cerebellum NA 18 −72 −30 2.25 10 1 24 −81 −33 6.25 375 0.000
R. Thalamus 50 18 −15 0 2.65 19 1 15 −21 9 3.89 4 0.979
BA, Brodmann area; t, t score; k, spatial extent of activation; p, corrected p-value. Activations are reported in MNI coordinate space. Areas in which the Incarcerated sample showed
greater activation than Healthy Controls are highlighted in red. Areas in which the Healthy Controls showed greater activation than the Incarcerated sample are highlighted in green. TPJ,
Temporoparietal Junction; MTG, Middle Temporal Gyrus; PCC, Posterior Cingulate Cortex; dmPFC, Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex; ACC, Anterior Cingulate Cortex; dlPFC, Dorsolateral
Prefrontal Cortex; vmPFC, Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex; vlPFC, Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex.
extending into the anterior insula (aINS). Hypoactivation was
observed bilaterally in the parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) and
anterior thalamus (THAL). Cocaine users did not show greater
hemodynamic activity in the moral > non-moral contrast,
compared to the mNCUs, in any regions of interest (see Table 4).
Within the CU sample, no significant correlations were
found between hemodynamic activity in the moral > non-moral
contrast and severity of cocaine use. Factor 1 scores, however,
were negatively correlated with hemodynamic activity in the
right vSTR and rACC in the moral > non-moral contrast (see
Table 5). For those in the CU sample with duration of abstinence
information (n = 61), duration of abstinence from cocaine
was negatively correlated with hemodynamic activity in the right
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) for the moral > non-moral
contrast (see Table 6).
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated whether cocaine abuse held any
relationship to the neural systems underlying moral intuition,
and what impact psychopathic traits might have on this
relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, individuals in the
Cocaine Users group exhibited significantly reduced activation
while viewing moral pictures relative to non-moral pictures in
several cortico-limbic regions, compared to their non-cocaine
using counterparts. In the left hemisphere, these included the
ventral striatum (vSTR), subgenual cingulate cortex (sgACC),
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). On the right,
hypoactivity was observed in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC) extending into the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex
(pgACC), and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) extending
into the anterior insula (aINS). Additionally, cocaine users higher
in psychopathic traits exhibited additional neural abnormalities
in the right vSTR andmore severe aberration in the right pgACC.
CUs exhibited reduced activity in the left vSTR during moral
vs. non-moral picture processing, when compared to mNCUs.
Moreover, within the CU group, hemodynamic activity in the
right vSTR was negatively correlated with Factor 1 scores. A
plethora of research has established that this reward pathway is
involved in the perception of social stimuli and social interaction
(Skuse and Gallagher, 2009; Volkow et al., 2011; Lin et al.,
2012), and is theorized to be crucially involved in motivating
prosocial behavior (Moll et al., 2006; Izuma et al., 2010). During
moral intuition, the vSTR may be partially responsible for the
generation of a negative affective state associated with witnessing
an immoral act. Although, commonly associated with positive
feedback linked to reward, the vSTR has also been implicated
in the generation of negative emotional states (Horvitz, 2000;
Pruessner et al., 2004).
Functional abnormalities within the vSTR are consistent with
our etiological account of cocaine’s effect on social cognition.
Acute administration of cocaine increases extracellular dopamine
(DA) levels by blocking presynaptic dopamine transporter (DAT;
Ritz et al., 1987). With regular use, compensatory changes begin
to occur, such as downregulation of DA receptors, transporters,
and function (Adinoff, 2004). Cocaine abusers have shown
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FIGURE 1 | Main Effect of Moral > Non-Moral condition in healthy controls (p-threshold =0.05).
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TABLE 4 | Imaging results from group comparison of Cocaine Users (CU) and Matched Non-Cocaine Users (mNCU).
Moral > Non-Moral
mNCU > CU BA x y z t k p
L. subgenual ACC 32/25 −6 21 −3 4.62 52 0.056
R. Superior Frontal Gyrus 10 24 48 12 4.88 39 0.134
R. Middle Frontal Gyrus* 10/32 21 45 12 4.04 64 0.004
R. Inferior Frontal Gyrus* 47 33 24 −18 3.25 33 0.044
L. Medial Frontal Gyrus* 10 −3 54 −6 3.32 64 0.037
L. ventral ACC* 10/11/32 −9 42 −6 4.05 98 0.004
R. Cuneus* 19/18/17 12 −63 6 3.66 124 0.014
R. Precuneus* 7 15 −75 54 3.7 145 0.012
R. Parahippocampal Gyrus* 19/36/37 21 −45 −6 3.51 77 0.022
L. Middle Temporal Gyrus* 21/37 −48 −48 −3 3.32 86 0.037
L. Parahippocampal Gyrus* 36 −18 −42 0 3.62 41 0.016
L. Thalamus* 50 −9 −3 6 3.26 81 0.043
R. Thalamus* 50/48 12 −6 15 3.13 15 0.059
CU > mNCU
None
BA, Brodmann area; t, t score; k, spatial extent of activation. Activations are reported in MNI coordinate space. Regions marked with an asterisk (*) were identified after small volume
correction using regions of interest; p-values for these regions represent FWE small-volume-corrected values. Regions without an asterisk were identified during whole-brain analysis;
p-values for these regions are corrected p-values.
TABLE 5 | Imaging results from regression with psychopathy within the cocaine users group.
Moral > Non-Moral
Factor 1 BA x y z t k p
Positive Correlation
None
Negative Correlation
R. ventral Striatum 52/48 9 3 −9 3.82 17 0.011
R. rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex 32 15 33 21 3.47 18 0.031
Factor 2
None
BA, Brodmann area; t, t score; k, spatial extent of activation. Activations are reported in MNI coordinate space. Regions marked with an asterisk (*) were identified after small volume
correction using regions of interest; p-values for these regions represent FWE small-volume-corrected values. Regions without an asterisk were identified during whole-brain analysis;
p-values for these regions are corrected p-values.
reductions in D2 receptor binding, extending into prolonged
abstinence (Volkow et al., 1990), which may be associated with
increased DA transporter availability (Bowers et al., 1998). One
of the most common functional abnormalities exhibited by
cocaine users is and over-reactivity to cocaine-related stimuli
and under-reactivity to stimuli with any other contant (Aguilar
de Arcos et al., 2005; Volkow et al., 2010), and this differential
reactivity is generally associated with aberrant vSTR activity
(Volkow et al., 2006; Childress et al., 2008; Asensio et al., 2010;
Dunning et al., 2011; Holroyd et al., 2014). Our findings suggest
that, in addition to being under-reactive to non-drug rewards,
cocaine users may also be under-reactive to aversive stimuli
which are unrelated to cocaine use, such as depictions of immoral
acts.
As part of the mesocorticolimbic domapine pathway, the
vSTR projects to many of the other brain regions in which
CUs exhibited hypoactivity— including the mPFC, ACC and
aINS (Haber, 2011). These areas also work collectively as part
of the “visceromotor network”— which is thought to play a
critical role in the identification of the emotional significance
of environmental stimuli, the production of affective states, and
automatic regulation of these autonomic responses to emotive
stimuli via the production of visceral states (Phillips et al., 2003;
Critchley, 2005; Lindquist et al., 2012). During social cognition,
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TABLE 6 | Imaging results from regression with duration of abstinence from cocaine within the cocaine users group.
Moral > Non-Moral
Cocaine Abstinence BA x y z t k p
Positive Correlation
None
Negative Correlation
R. posterior Cingulate Cortex* 23 18 −60 2 3.6 102 0.026
BA, Brodmann area; t, t score; k, spatial extent of activation. Activations are reported in MNI coordinate space. Regions marked with an asterisk (*) were identified after small volume
correction using regions of interest; p-values for these regions represent FWE small-volume-corrected values. Regions without an asterisk were identified during whole-brain analysis;
p-values for these regions are corrected p-values.
this network is largely responsible for our tendency to reflexively
embody the bodily states of observed agents— a process thought
to be a central component of affective empathy (Decety and
Jackson, 2004; Lamm et al., 2011; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012; Raz
et al., 2014) and social cognition more generally (Vogt, 2005;
Amodio and Frith, 2006).
Both moral and non-moral pictures have negatively valenced
affective content insofar as they depict people who are suffering.
Moral pictures, however, are distinct in that they depict a
transgressor who is inflicting that suffering on a victim. This
additional feature is likely to give moral stimuli additional
affective salience— stemming from a reflexive appreciation of
the affective state of the victim or an aversive response to
the “wrongness” of the transgressor’s behavior. Hypoactivity
within this visceromotor network during moral vs. non-moral
picture processing suggests that CUs are relatively insensitive to
this difference in affective content. In other words, the neural
abnormalities identified may be indicative of an aberration
in the affective component of moral intuition in cocaine
users.
In contrast to mNCUs, who recruited the left vmPFC more
during moral compared to non-moral picture processing, CUs
exhibited similar hemodynamic activity in this region across
both types of stimuli. The vmPFC has been implicated in moral
cognition across amyriad of studies (e.g., Greene et al., 2001;Moll
et al., 2001, 2002a,b; Heekeren et al., 2003; Harenski andHamann,
2006; Luo et al., 2006; Schiach-Borg et al., 2006; Prehn et al.,
2007; Harenski et al., 2009; Young and Saxe, 2009; Shenhav and
Greene, 2010; Sommer et al., 2010). Within healthy populations,
the vmPFC is responsible for integrating emotional information
into decision-making (Rolls, 2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005;
Lindquist et al., 2012) and is therefore thought to be involved
in the affective aspects of moral cognition (Greene et al., 2001;
Moll et al., 2002a,b; Heekeren et al., 2003). Individuals who
have suffered damage to this area often exhibit impulsive and
callous behavior (Rolls et al., 1994; Grafman et al., 1996; Brower
and Price, 2001) along with abnormal moral cognition, which
is generally interpreted to be the result of an emotional deficit
(Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al.,
2010; Thomas et al., 2011). Increased activity during moral
picture processing in the vmPFC may therefore be the result of a
stronger affective reaction to the moral content of those stimuli.
Correspondingly, similar recruitment of this region across both
types of stimuli may be the result of a comparatively reduced
affective response to moral stimuli.
Cocaine users showed a similar abnormal pattern of neural
activity in two regions of the pgACC—one adjacent to the
dmPFC (rACC) and the other adjacent to the vmPFC (vACC).
In both these regions, mNCUs exhibited greater hemodynamic
activity for moral vs. non-moral stimuli, while CUs did not. The
pgACC is selectively engaged when task-irrelevant information
interferes with performance due to its emotional content
(Whalen et al., 1998; Haas et al., 2006; Mohanty et al., 2007; Egner
et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2009; Etkin et al., 2011; Kanske and
Kotz, 2011a,b; Iordan et al., 2013). The more dorsal portion of
the pgACC helps resolve these emotional conflicts by inhibiting
incongruent emotional reactions (Ochsner et al., 2004; Koenigs
and Tranel, 2007; Diekhof et al., 2011; Amemori and Graybiel,
2012), possibly through a down-regulation of amygdalar activity
(Etkin et al., 2006; Bissière et al., 2008). Importantly, however, the
need for regulation does not appear to be necessary for pgACC
activity. Several studies have found ACC activity in response
to emotional stimuli even in contexts where attentional control
was not required for performance (Pissiota et al., 2003; Kosson
et al., 2006; Nakic et al., 2006; Chiu et al., 2008; Todd et al.,
2014). It is likely, therefore, the pgACC is involved both in the
identification of salient emotional information and the emotional
conflict regulation.
Compared to mNCUs, CUs exhibited substantially less
hemodynamic activity in the sgACC during moral relative to
non-moral picture processing. Functionally, the sgACC has been
consistently implicated in emotional processing (Cromheeke and
Mueller, 2014). This area has strong projections to visceral and
emotional control centers such as the amygdala and ventral
striatum (Johansen-Berg et al., 2007; Vogt and Vogt, 2009) and
is thought to play a crucial role in mood disorders marked
by anhedonia (Greicius et al., 2007; Drevets et al., 2008).
Recent research has also implicated the sgACC in socio-moral
emotions such as guilt, a self-referential emotion generally
elicited by the violation of moral norms (Zahn et al., 2009a;
Green et al., 2010; Basile et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2011),
and empathic concern for the victims of harmful actions (Zahn
et al., 2009b; Decety et al., 2012; Wiech et al., 2013). sgACC
activity has also been implicated in the implicit processing of
morally salient statements (Luo et al., 2006; Schiach-Borg et al.,
2008).
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One noteworthy complication in this interpretation is that,
unlike all the other regions of hypoactivity amongst the CUs, the
pattern of results in the sgACC indicated similar deactivation in
the moral and non-moral conditions for the NCUs and greater
deactivation in the moral relative to non-moral condition for
the cocaine users (see Figure 2). Given the purported role of
the sgACC in empathic concern and the fact that both moral
and non-moral stimuli depicted suffering, similar activation in
this area between stimulus types might be expected. Conversely,
however, this would imply that the cocaine users had less of an
empathic response when the suffering was due to an immoral
act than when it was not. Research on the role of the sgACC
in social cognition, especially moral processing, is in its infancy.
Future investigations may find that this region plays a much
more complex part in moral cognition, and help to provide an
explanation for this finding.
Lastly, it is worth noting that, within the Cocaine User group,
no significant correlations were found between the severity of
cocaine use and hemodynamic activity during moral picture
processing. Many functional neuroimaging studies on substance
use have found similar results. This discrepancy might be
resolved with an improved measure for cocaine use severity.
Additional information which may improve severity measures
includes: the age(s) of the participant during regular use, the
average quantity of cocaine used during periods of regular
use and the duration of abstinence from cocaine use prior to
scanning. Moreover, devising a substance use measure which
applies to individuals who used a drug with some frequency,
but fewer than three times a week, would help to normalize the
distribution of that measure within the population.
Consistent with our second hypothesis regarding the
interaction between psychopathy and cocaine abuse, within
the cocaine users, higher Factor 1 scores were associated with
reduced activity in the right vSTR and rACC. These regions
have been implicated separately in both substance abuse and
psychopathy research
Several studies have identified functional (Kiehl et al., 2001;
Buckholtz et al., 2010; Bjork et al., 2012; Decety et al., 2013;
Pujara et al., 2013) and structural (Glenn et al., 2010; Schiffer
et al., 2011; Boccardi et al., 2013; Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2013)
striatal abnormalities in individuals high in psychopathic traits.
Individuals who are less empathic would be expected to have less
of a negative affective reaction to witnessing someone else being
wronged. Reduced vSTR activity while observing immoral acts in
cocaine users who exhibit more of the interpersonal and affective
psychopathic traits, is consistent with the purported role of this
region in moral intuition.
Similarly, both cocaine users and psychopaths have
demonstrated hypoactivity in the right rACC. Within
psychopathy research, hypoactivity within the rACC has
been associated with reduced allocation of attention toward the
affective content of stimuli (Kiehl et al., 2001; Müller et al., 2003;
Birbaumer et al., 2005). Several different etiological models of
psychopathy have proposed an attention deficit as being central
to the disorder (MacCoon et al., 2004; Hiatt and Newman, 2006;
Kiehl, 2006). The paralimbic dysfunction model hypothesizes
that the deficit is in emotional attention specifically—whereby
psychopaths are under-reactive to affective information outside
the current focus of attention (Kiehl, 2006). This hypothesis has
been supported by a number of studies showing that psychopaths
tend to perform better than average when the task containing
emotional information that is incongruent with performance
(Christianson et al., 1996; Mitchell et al., 2006) and worse when
it is relevant (Williamson et al., 1991; Lorenz and Newman,
2002). However, the fact that this region was also found to be
hypoactive in CUs compared to mNCU, who did not differ on
FIGURE 2 | Activity in the left subgenual ACC during the Moral > Non-Moral condition.
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Factor 1 scores suggests that cocaine use has an independent
and potentially additive impact on attentional allocation during
implicit moral processing. Within the substance abuse literature,
abnormal neural activity in the rACC amongst cocaine users has
primarily been associated with the ‘attentional bias’ they exhibit
toward cocaine-related stimuli (Goldstein et al., 2007, 2009,
2010; Ersche et al., 2010). An attentional bias toward cocaine
related stimuli may have resulted in an attentional bias away
from the morally relevant affective content of the stimuli. It is
important to note, however, that support for this interpretation
is limited by the fact that participants’ allocation of attention
during the implicit moral task was not directly measured. Future
research into the interaction between substance abuse and
psychopathy may benefit from testing this interpretation more
rigorously. During implicit moral processing, this bias appears
to have resulted in cocaine users being insensitive to the morally
relevant affective content in the stimuli. Similarly, several
different etiological models of psychopathy have proposed
an attention deficit as being central to the disorder (Kiehl,
2006; Hiatt and Newman, 2006; MacCoon et al., 2004). The
paralimbic dysfunction model hypothesizes that the deficit is
in emotional attention specifically—whereby psychopaths are
under-reactive to affective information outside the current
focus of attention (Kiehl, 2006). This hypothesis has been
supported by a number of studies showing that psychopaths
tend to perform better than average when the task containing
emotional information that is incongruent with performance
(Christianson et al., 1996; Mitchell et al., 2006) and worse when
it is relevant (Lorenz and Newman, 2002; Williamson et al.,
1991). Moroever, this under-reactivity to affective information
has been associated with hypoactivity in the rACC amongst
psychopaths (Kiehl et al., 2001; Müller et al., 2003; Birbaumer
et al., 2005).
In summary, former regular cocaine users exhibited abnormal
neural activity during implicit moral cognition in several
corticolimbic brain regions. Unlike their non-cocaine using
peers, members of the Cocaine Users group failed to discriminate
betweenmorally irrelevant depictions of negative social scenarios
and depictions of moral violations at a neural level. The
frontostriatal regions in which this abnormal hypoactivity
occurred suggest that this reflexive, perceptual discrimination is
most likely rooted in affective processes. Thus, while the majority
of the sample found the moral pictures to be more affectively
arousing than the non-moral ones, those who had once regularly
used cocaine did not.
These findings add to a growing body of research suggesting
a deleterious effect of substance abuse on high-level socio-
affective processes like moral cognition. Not only can drugs of
abuse alter our natural reward pathway so that one does not
find non-drug rewards to be arousing, but it can also lead to
insensitivity toward negative stimuli— such as witnessing an
immoral act. Consequently, abnormalities in this pathway, such
as those seen in chronic cocaine abusers, may correspond to
significant alterations in individuals’ social cognitive processing.
Within moral psychology, this is consistent with an increasingly
popular view that striatal reward processing plays an important
role in moral cognition— both in promoting prosociality and
depressing immoral or antisocial behaviors. Within addiction
research, alterations in socio-affective processing may help to
explain both the antisocial behaviors of current and former
addicts and the propensity of former addicts to relapse into
substance use many years after withdrawal. Overvaluation of the
individual’s drug of choice may be coupled with a devaluation
of prosocial reinforcers, such as spending time with friends or
family, and a reduced aversion toward the negative outcomes
associated with substance abuse.
LIMITATIONS
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, the results
of this study cannot be used to make any strong claims regarding
the casual influence of cocaine use on moral intuition. It is
possible that individuals prone to regular cocaine use exhibited
the observed deficits in moral intuition before they began using
cocaine.
Second, substance use severity ratings were based on self-
report, allowing for the possibility that some participants under-
reported their past or current substance use. However, there
are several reasons to assume that actual under-reporting within
our population was relatively low. Current substance use may
have been under-reported due to a fear of negative consequences
for reporting current drug use. However, all participants were
assured that all of the information they revealed about themselves
would remain confidential and that none of what they reported
to the interviewer would have any impact on their institutional
status. Additionally, past or current substance abuse may have
been under-reported due to social desirability concerns. Existing
research on the accuracy of self-reported cocaine use within
incarcerated populations suggests that, while under-reporting
does occur, incarcerated participants are less likely to under-
report due to social desirability concerns than community
samples (Harrison and Hughes, 1997; Hser, 1997; Fendrich et al.,
1999). Within our own population, CUs and mNCUs did not
significantly differ on impression management or self-deception,
as measured by the BIDR. Moreover, within the CUs, social
desirability was not correlated with self-reported cocaine use or
self-reported abstinence from cocaine use.
The present study used a 1.5T Mobile MRI scanner. Whereas,
we have published on the reliability of 1.5T for fMRI (Kiehl
et al., 2005), it is possible that additional effects may be found at
higher field strengths. Nevertheless, we were able to confirm our
hypotheses (and collect the data from this prison sample) with
1.5T MRI.
Finally, based on data for a separate study where urinary
toxicology screens were administered during a research study at
the same site, stimulant use during incarceration appears to be
relatively uncommon and under-reporting of current stimulant
use appears to be very low. Of 62 incarcerated participants
taking part in a substance abuse treatment program, only 2
reported stimulant use during their incarceration. Additionally,
out of 34 incarcerated participants who completed the ASI and
received a UA, only 1 participant reported no current cocaine
use, but tested positive for cocaine (Kiehl laboratory, unpublished
data).
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